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ABSTRACT
Eleven percent of companies spend between $150K and $200K per year per engineer on
software development tools and nine percent spend more than $200K, according to a
Silicon Integration Initiative/Gartner/EE Times study from 2002. For Agilent
Technologies, these costs result in spending tens of millions of dollars each year on
software, and for Motorola, the costs are more than $1 OOM each year. From the current
trends in software spending, one can infer that companies will pay even more for
software in the future, because the cost of the software itself is rising and because of the
complexity of the technology needed for innovation.
In order to understand whether the total spending on software is appropriate and
necessary, Agilent sponsored this project to create a model that analyzes the trade-offs
between the cost of software and the cost of software unavailability. The model treats
software licenses as supplies to the development of a product, and thus, supply chain
methodologies such as inventory (cost of licenses), stock outs (cost of unavailability) and
service level are applied. The goal of the model is to minimize software costs while
maintaining a satisfactory level of service. The thesis explains the model and then shows
the results from applying it to four software products that Agilent currently uses.
The results show that in the absence of this type of analysis, Agilent spends more than
necessary for software licenses. In fact, Agilent can reduce costs by at least 5%. This
model can be used by Agilent and other companies to optimize software purchases.
Thesis Supervisor: Sara Beckman, Sr. Lecturer, Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley
Thesis Supervisor: Abbott Weiss, Sr. Lecturer, Engineering Systems Division, MIT
Thesis Reader: Donald Rosenfield, Sr. Lecturer, Sloan School of Management, MIT
Thesis Reader: Cynthia Barnhart, Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, MIT
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Project Motivation:
More than forty percent of the 166 companies studied in 2002 by Silicon Integration
Initiative/Gartner/EE Times spend more than one hundred thousand dollars per engineer
on design automation tools.' This money is spent to acquire licenses or copies of the
software to perform various engineering tasks ranging from printed circuit board
assembly layout to integrated circuit simulation to testing software code. Historically,
companies have purchased local licenses for each group within the company. In the past
five years, however, they have started to acquire the licenses at the corporate level, and to
share them globally across the engineering functions in the company2.
These companies have realized major cost savings as a result, as they can buy far fewer
licenses to serve the overall demand when those licenses are shared. A small consortium
of companies that have implemented global licensing (e.g., Agilent, Intel, Ford,
Honeywell, Motorola, Texas Instruments) share best-known practices by meeting twice a
month. However, the process of forecasting demand for licenses, deciding how many to
acquire and administering their use within the company still needs improvement. This
drive for improving the global licensing program motivated Agilent to develop the
project described in this thesis.
Agilent Technologies, in particular, spends tens of millions of dollars each year on
software used by engineers to develop products, but it does not have a rigorous approach
to determine whether the amount spent is necessary to support the needs of the
organization. The goal of this project is to provide Agilent a more analytic method for
minimizing centralized license software costs while maintaining a satisfactory level of
service for the design engineers. This project employs a quantitative method based on
'Silicon Integrated Initiative Inc., Gartner Dataquest, EE Times. Engineering Design Automation Study.
May 2002.
2 Griffith, Dan Chairperson, Central Enterprise Licensing User Group (22 company consortium) and
Manager, Comprehensive Software Asset Management at Motorola. E-mail dated 12-2-03.
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those used in supply chain management to evaluate the tradeoffs between the cost of
licenses (i.e., having an inventory of licenses) and the cost of license unavailability (i.e.,
having engineers sit idle, or project launch delayed). The value of this project is to have
better information than is currently provided by heuristics, thus saving Agilent money.
1.2 Chapter Overview
This chapter introduces the project and outlines the results of an internship conducted at
Agilent Technologies in the summer and fall of 2003. It also gives a high-level overview
of the company and the group that hosted the internship. Finally, it explains the
organization of this thesis.
1.3 Project Overview:
Based on the literature on supply chain management, specifically related to balancing
inventory carrying costs and customer service levels, I developed a model for examining
the tradeoffs between software license costs and license unavailability. I then conducted
case studies on four different software products that varied in terms of cost, complexity
and usage patterns. In each case, I studied the usage patterns for those products over the
past year, collected data on the costs of the licenses, and assessed the effects of
unavailability of the products to the engineering organization and the company at large.
From this information, I was able to determine an optimal number (inventory) of licenses
to have based on the costs of licenses and the cost of unavailability (stock outs) at
different service levels.
In the current business environment, the average of the results of the case studies showed
that Agilent can save more than 5% of what it currently spends on software licenses by
reducing the number of licenses it owns. The general results from the case studies will
aid in making determinations for other current and future software products.
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Furthermore, the model itself can be used to predict license requirements as the economy
recovers and business conditions change.
1.4 Agilent Overview
Agilent Technologies' mission is: "to provide solutions and technologies that
revolutionize the way people live and work." Agilent is a $6 billion company that has
been unprofitable from August 2001 until October 2003 (effectively the 9 quarters
preceding and including this internship). Agilent was originally made up of three groups
from Hewlett Packard (HP). HP (now Hewlett Packard Compaq), founded in 1939,
decided to spin-off these groups on November 1, 1999 in order to form Agilent
Technologies. See 1.4.1.
March 2, 1999
HP announces creation of
two independent companies
1W
November 1, 1999 June 2, 2000
Agilent starts operating as Agilent becomes
an independent company fully independent
wi
July 28, 1999
Agilent's name
is introduced
November 18, 1999
Agilent's IPO
takes place
Figure 1.4.1 Timeline of Agilent's spin-off from HP3
Agilent now has four main business groups: Test and Measurement (TMG), Automated
Test Equipment (ATG), Semiconductor Products (SPG) and Life Sciences and Chemical
Analysis (LSCA).
The Test and Measurement Group (TMG) is the largest and accounts for about 43% of
Agilent's revenue and includes the Automated Test, Communications Solutions and
3 Figure taken from Agilent Profile Slides, Agilent Technologies, Inc., 2003
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1qW
Electronic Product and Solutions divisions. The core businesses within the group are
communications test, electronics test and service 4. TMG considers broadband, IP/data
networking, wireless, network management software and aerospace/defense areas of
opportunity. This group produces products such as oscilloscopes, RF and Microwave
instruments and systems, and lightwave and photonic measurement solutions.
The next largest group, which generates about 26% of Agilent's revenue, is the
Semiconductor Products Group (SPG). SPG lists its core businesses as fiber optic
communications, infrared components, ASICs and optoelectronics. Future opportunities
include gigabit networking, cellular chipsets, wireless appliance, and networking ASICs.
One of the blockbuster products that came out of this group in the last few years is the
optical device that is used in computer mouse devices.
Life Sciences and Chemical Analysis (LSCA), which makes up about 20% of Agilent's
revenue, has maintained profitability even during the times when Agilent as a whole was
not realizing a profit. This group has products in the exciting biotechnology space,
including micro arrays, gene expression and proteomics. Support services and training
bring in about 20% of the revenue for this group. Traditional products include chemical
analysis equipment such as general and liquid chromatography and mass spectrometry
tools. Areas of opportunity include lab-on-a-chip, bridging informatics, as well as
homeland defense, food safety and environmental work in Asia.
The Assembly Test Group (ATG) brings in about 11% of Agilent's revenue. This group
has equipment for testing parametric diagnostics, non-volatile memory, mixed-signal,
analogs, systems-on-a-chip, automated x-rays etc. It sees future opportunities in areas
such as digital consumer and wireless products and enterprise networking and storage.
An organization chart with all these groups is shown in Figure 1.4.2 below.
4 Product information from Agilent Profile Slides, Agilent Technologies Inc, 2003
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Life Sciences
Chemical Anatysis
Chris van Ingen
Figure 1.4.2 Organization Chart for Agilent Technologies
As is clear from the lists of inventive technologies and product lines, new product
development is core to Agilent's future success. All of these groups use software in the
development of their products. Some software tools are used solely in certain groups;
ASIC design tools, for example, are used only in SPG. Other software products, such as
software bug detection tools, are used in every business. Thus, the research represented
in this thesis is germane to the entire organization and critical in supporting the
organization's future.
1.5 Agilent Engineering Services (AES) Overview
In addition to these business groups, Agilent has centralized support groups that it refers
to as the Global Infrastructure (GI). Groups such as finance and legal are part of the GI
as well as the group that hosted this project, Agilent Engineering Services (AES). AES
plays two critical roles: it provides central engineering support and owns the centralized
11
---------  -- ---------- ---- - 
Semiconductor
Products
Young Sohn
Automtated Test
Jack Trautman
systems for product generation. Central engineering support includes the role of
coordinating knowledge transfer and process leadership among engineers in different
organizations and geographies. The group's projects include implementing a global
enterprise resource planning system and holding monthly knowledge-sharing meetings
with engineers in the same discipline from different business groups. This group is also
responsible for managing central software licensing.
Originally, each of the four business groups negotiated its own software licenses for the
software to support its new product development, but a coordination initiative launched
by AES resulted in sharing software licenses across the corporation. For the past 2 years,
AES has negotiated and managed the contracts for twelve software vendors that provide
software for such tasks as ASIC development, printed circuit board design and software
coding. This consolidation effort alone saved Agilent a large amount of money as they
reduced duplicative efforts, were able to negotiate better deals with some of the software
vendors, and could carry fewer licenses while still providing the same service level. AES
is now ready to take the next step, however, to fine tune the centralized process and see if
there is the potential for further savings. AES thus developed the problem statement for
the project for this thesis:
Agilent would like to allow our engineers to have access to the best tools,
whenever they need them. However, this is prohibitively expensive, so a balance
between supply and demand needs to be struck. The problem we face is to know
where that balance point is, predict it and be able to supply our engineers at that
level.
1.6 Summary of Findings
The research project results indicate that in the absence of a cost analysis, Agilent buys at
least 5% more software licenses than it needs. Without the cost data, Agilent can only
rely on past usage charts and informed intuition for making decisions on quantities of
12
licenses to buy. The cost information, coupled with usage information, gives Agilent a
powerful tool to determine whether buying more licenses is really worth the expense.
Cost pressures at Agilent are intense, particularly after two years without profits, so this
analysis is very timely. There is the possibility of saving more than $ 1M per year using
this model. Further, as Agilent starts to make money and grow, this model will allow the
company to appropriately increase the number of licenses purchased to meet the growing
needs of the organization.
1.7 Project Management (PM): The Construct
In order to conduct the project, I used Agilent Engineering Services' (AES) tailored
project management process. The PM tools forced me to operate to a schedule. They
also created a direction for the project and ensured that management was aware of my
plans.
I include this section in my thesis, in part, because of anecdotal evidence I've collected
from my classmates about the lack of project management on many of their projects.
Overall, I found these tools useful, and I believe that my classmates would have benefited
from the use of this type of tool.
1.7.1 Overview of PM tools for AES
AES employs a project management lifecycle tool for each of its projects. There are five
main sections: concept, proposal, execute/monitor/control, close and lessons learned.
The execute/monitor/control portion is made up of four phases: analysis, design, build
and validate. (See figure below 1.7.1.1)
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Analysis Design Bild Valkate
E'xecute MCltronwCnto
Project Plan
WBS
Risk Matrix
NPV Analysis
Figure 1.7.1.1 Project Management Lifecycle
A project starts at the conceptual phase. At this point, someone has an idea for a project
that will aid the company, but the details are unspecified. The employee writes up a
concept sheet and receives approval from management to go to the proposal phase.
During the proposal phase, the employee writes a clear project plan with a problem
statement, the business goals, the scope, the resources needed etc. This is all presented
to management along with a risk matrix, a net present value analysis, and a work
breakdown structure (WBS). If this is approved, the project enters the analysis phase and
actual work begins on the project itself.
A standard project would continue through the design, build and validate phases with
management review after each phase. However, if it makes sense to combine phases
because iteration is needed or design and build can be one effort, then this is possible. In
fact, the lead for this process in AES said about the project management tools, "It's not
the templates and it's not even the process, it's really about the thinking," 5 so there is
room for flexibility when it makes sense.
AES uses one lifecycle to make the process straightforward to the users, but there are
many different lifecycles that can be used depending on the focus of the project.6 These
include control-oriented project lifecycles, quality-oriented lifecycles and risk-oriented
5 Wright, Gene, Process Lead for AES Program Management tools at Agilent. Phone conversation 9-03.
6 Bonnal, Pierre, Didier, Gourc, and Lacoste, Germain "The life cycle of technical projects" Project
Management Journal. Vol 3 Mar 2002 p.1
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lifecycles.7 A control-oriented project lifecycle, for example, would focus on ensuring
that the project meets its specifications throughout the implementation phase and meets
the schedule within budget; a quality-oriented lifecycle would spend more time on
validating that the results prove, without any ambiguity, the original intent of the project.
AES' lifecycle is more general. It includes components of control, quality and risk, but it
focuses on each of these at a higher level than the lifecycles described above. This is so
that it can apply to all of the projects for the group.
In addition to using a standard lifecycle, AES also makes the process simple by offering
templates for many of the tasks. There are templates for all of the documentation for the
proposal phase, and phase reviews have a power point template. There is also a similar
power point template for program reviews, which occur between phase reviews in order
to give management an update on the project's progress. These program reviews provide
monthly updates on the project, and project managers are also encouraged to publish
weekly updates. This provides an opportunity for stakeholders to give feedback
throughout the process.
1.7.2 Assessment of the PM tools as applied to this project
The PM process was easy to learn, and after a week at Agilent, I knew the basic
components. Most projects would have started with the concept phase. However, that
phase was completed before I arrived: management had created the project and had
already bought into it. Therefore, as soon as I talked to a couple of people and gathered
ideas about my project, I began writing the proposal documentation. Even though by this
point I had some idea about my project, I did struggle to convey the goals, objectives, and
the risks in the plan. I also struggled to compute the expected net present value of the
project because it was based on huge assumptions, so the analysis seemed questionable to
me.
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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
I had a lot of apprehension in the beginning, but as I started the analysis phase, I kept
going back to the original proposal to help with scope and to remember the original
intent. Although I thought the original plan would not reflect the actual execution, I
found that it did. The proposal served as the foundation for the next steps and is still
applicable at the end of the project. It helped me decide when to take one path versus
another, but it was not too restrictive. Later the words I used in the program plan took a
quantitative form and had a deeper layer of meaning. Some of the statements became
inaccurate, but nonetheless the proposal documents were very powerful and useful.
The PM tools gave structure to the project and provided a built-in process for managing
the project. Even though the actual work to be done was not always clear, there was
never any question about the process to use. I talked with other MIT interns working at
different companies, and many of them did not set up formal plans in the beginning. This
often resulted in frustration and unclear goals, and even a struggle to come up with a
coherent thesis topic towards the end of the internship. However, I did not encounter
these problems because of the PM tools, which provided clear guidance throughout the
internship.
In addition, I received instruction on the tools and support and encouragement for
utilizing them. The PM tools provided the most impact at the beginning of the project
and in the getting-started phase. Later in the project lifecycle, the communication and
review tools were used, but they required a lot less thought and did not aid in shaping the
project.
One point of note in the process is that preparing for the presentations often took a
significant amount of time. The purpose of the presentations is to communicate the
results to date and receive feedback. AES conveys that the presentations can and should
be created quickly, but I did not find this to be the case. However, it was beneficial to put
in this time because it resulted in more substantial feedback; AES should not bill the
presentations as a quick endeavor.
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1.8 Organization of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis provides more detail about the development of the model and
the results achieved in the four case studies. Specifically, Chapter 2 describes the
application of supply chain methodology to software licenses and the particular model
developed as part of this project. Chapter 3 then reports the findings of the models for
four different software products. The results in Chapter 3 are based on historical data, so
Chapter 4 explores the effects that various future events might have on the integrity of the
findings and also recommends points at which to reexamine the results. Chapter 5
describes the organizational environment and its effects on the project. Finally, Chapter
6 gives the recommendations and lessons learned.
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Chapter 2: Project Description: Applying Supply Chain Concepts to Software License
Acquisition
2.1 Introduction
Agilent Engineering Services has a team of people responsible for the Engineering
Design Automation (EDA) global-software-tool licensing program. Three of the
members of this team manage the contracts with the suppliers and determine the license
needs for each software tool. No standard process for making decisions on number of
licenses exists, but the negotiators look at usage graphs that include usage utilization and
periods of peak usage when making their decisions. Each negotiator's intuition also
plays a role in the decision making process.
AES management wanted to know whether its investment in EDA software tools was
appropriate. With the current process, the negotiators did not take detailed cost trade-off
information into consideration when making decisions and did not know whether they
were purchasing the optimal number of licenses to adequately serve the engineering
community at reasonable cost. As a result, AES created this project to construct a cost-
based model.
After reviewing different modeling techniques, I chose a supply chain model that is
commonly applied to physical products. The methodology relies on basic supply chain
concepts such as inventory, stock out and service levels. Specifically, the methodology
calculates the cost of having inventory (in this case the cost to purchase software
licenses) and the cost of having stock outs (in this case the cost of not providing an
engineer with a software tool when needed) and allows the user to identify a cost
effective level of service (acceptable number of stock outs). This chapter describes the
application of supply chain concepts for software licenses and the definition of the
specific terminology for this project.
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2.2 Comparing Cost of Licenses (inventory) and Cost of Unavailability (stock out)
AES is responsible for contracting with suppliers for software licenses. In more than
60% of the contracts9 , it tells the software supplier how many licenses it needs, based on
the best estimates the negotiators can make about what demand will be over the life of the
contract, and then pays for that many licenses over the period of the contract. The
contract length varies from 3-5 years, and usage can fluctuate during that time. The
supplier makes the licenses available on a Central Licensing Server (CLS), supported by
Agilent, from which members of the worldwide Agilent engineering community can
check out the licenses. When all of the licenses are checked out, engineers must wait for
one to become available on the CLS. Agilent does not want to have so many licenses that
it is paying for a large number of unused licenses, but on the other hand, it wants to have
enough so that licenses are available when engineers need them. Assessing this tradeoff
is similar to determining how much inventory to carry of physical products: there are
costs of carrying unused or unsold inventory, and there are costs of not having that
inventory available when needed.
In making inventory trade-offs, a company will establish the amount of inventory such
that it can satisfy a specified demand. In doing so, it will consider the cost of holding this
inventory as well as the cost of unavailability or stock out. (This is the cost incurred when
a customer requests a product, and it is unavailable.) With this information, the company
will establish an optimal service level (number of times the product is available as a
percent of time asked for). In this project, I applied these same concepts of inventory,
stock outs and service levels to software tools.
2.3 Definition of Service Levels
9 On the other 40% or so of Agilent's contracts, the supplier will provide unlimited licenses and charge a
fixed amount or charge a pay per use fee. Under such circumstances, the model developed in this thesis is
less applicable but still provides some insight (See Section 3.3.2.3). When Agilent pays only for its usage,
then there need be no stock outs, and Agilent never pays for excess inventory of licenses.
19
Service level is a common supply chain term used to explain what percentage of the time
the orders for supplies or products will be filled or available from stock.10 For this
project, the service level translates into the number of hours that a license is available
each year when requested. In this model, I assumed that licenses may be requested 24
hours per day, 365 days per year. This is a reasonable assumption given that Agilent is a
global company, and that engineers are working somewhere in the world at any given
time during the day. In actual fact, for most licenses, there are regular requests
throughout the 24-hour day, but weekends and holidays show lower demand. As Agilent
increases its operations outside of the US there will be more consistent use throughout the
days and weeks. For now, my assumption of 24-hour use 365 days a year is
conservative; minimally, it ensures that peak (weekday) use is covered.
If Agilent chooses to offer a 99% service level, licenses are unavailable 1% of the time,
which is 88 (365 days/year * 24 hours/day * 0.01) hours per year. Other service levels
and their expected hours of unavailability are shown in Figure 2.3.1
Service Level Hours of unavailability each year
50% 4380
75% 2190
99% 88
99.9% 8.8
99.95% 4.4
99.99% < 1
99.995% < 0.5
Figure 2.3.1 Hours of Unavailability at Various Service Levels
These hours of unavailability are spread out over all of the users and over the entire year.
The probability that all the hours will occur in a row (meaning that one user would suffer
all 4.4 hours of unavailability at the 99.95% service level) is infinitesimal, and the
10 Hopp, Wallace J., Spearman, Mark L, Factory Physics: 2"d Edition. McGraw-Hill Higher Education
2001 p. 70, 489.
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probability that the same user will experience more than one outage depends on the total
number of users. (If there are more users, the probability that one user will experience
more than one outage decreases)
2.4 Model Inputs: Quantifying Costs of Licenses and Inventory
Holding unused software licenses results in an inventory cost (cost of overage) and
unavailable licenses result in stock out costs (cost of underage). In order to optimize
license numbers, I needed to quantify the cost of each of these for different service levels
for each software tool. I will explain how I determined the costs, including the data
collection process and the calculations used. I will also relate the assumptions and data
integrity issues, which will help to determine the model's applicability for varying
circumstances.
2.4.1 Cost of Licenses (inventory)
This section describes how I determined the cost of licenses for each of the service levels
of interest. It starts by describing the usage data I collected for each of the four licenses I
studied. It then describes how I used this data to determine the mean and standard
deviation of demand. Finally, it describes how I calculated the required number of
licenses for each service level.
The Central License Server (CLS) stores usage data for the software licenses it
distributes. For each of the four software tools I studied, I extracted hourly usage data for
periods of 3, (ex: Jul '02 - Sep '02) 6, (ex: Jul '02 - Dec '02), 9 (ex: Jul' 02 - Feb '03)
and 12 (ex: Jul '02 - Jun '03) months. I did the analysis at these different time intervals
in order to assess the usage data's sensitivity to time. If the data did change significantly
over time, then it would make sense to compare the results from the different time
intervals. However, at Agilent, there was not a meaningful difference when using 3
months of data versus 6 or 9 or 12. (This will be discussed again in Chapter 3.)
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Because the model I used to determine license needs at the various service levels requires
that the demand data be normally distributed (or that it be transformed to normally
distributed data), I first tested the data to see whether it was normally distributed. For the
demand data that was normally distributed, I calculated average demand and the
variability of the demand for each of the time periods examined (3-months of data, 6
months of data, 9 months of data and 12 months of data).
For the data that was not normally distributed, I attempted a transformation of the data to
make it so. Normally distributed data has skew and kurtosis values close to zero. It is
most important that skew be close to zero, so the goal when transforming data is to first
try to achieve a skew close to zero and then work on the kurtosis. Transformation is done
by applying an exponent (referred to as theta: 0) between 0 and 1. One iteratively applies
different exponents to the data set until the skew and kurtosis approach zero. Once the
optimal 0 is found, the average and standard deviation can be calculated. Later, the
estimated numbers of licenses can be untransformed by raising them to the power of 1/ 0.
The model works best if the data is normally distributed or transformable to normal.
However, if the data is not normal, the model can still provide useful insight. This will
be shown when reviewing the case study results in Chapter 3.
For a given service level, the necessary number of licenses can be calculated as the
expected or average number of licenses demanded plus a safety stock of licenses to cover
the variability in the demand. This safety stock is calculated as a "z" value times the
standard deviation of demand, where the "z" value is determined by the required service
level. The "z" value represents the point on the standard normal distribution curve for
which the area under the curve to the left of that point is equal to the service level. This
point is called the "inverse of the normal cumulative distribution" and can easily be
calculated using the NORMSINV function in Excel. So, for each service level of
interest, and each software tool I studied, I calculated the required number of licenses as:
Number of licenses required = E(D)+ z*GD (Formula 2.4.1.1)
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where E(D) = Expected Demand for licenses
z = the inverse of the normal cumulative distribution for the given service level
= NORMSINV (service level)
UD= standard deviation of demand
Once I knew the number of licenses required, I multiplied the number by a cost per
license to determine the cost of the licenses at different service levels. At Agilent, the
price of each license ranges from $1000 to $100,000. (This model assumes that there are
no additional overhead costs for storing the licenses or managing the licenses.) See
Figure 2.4.1.1 as an example of cost of licenses data:
Service Number of Licenses Cost of Licenses
Level (based on 6 month (price is $15,000)
usage data)
0.5 16 $240,000
0.7 20 $300,000
0.75 20 $300,000
0.8 21 $315,000
0.9 23 $345,000
0.95 26 $390,000
0.99 31 $465,000
0.999 35 $525,000
0.9999 40 $600,000
Figure 2.4.1.1 Example of License Numbers and Cost Data for 6 month Usage Data
Graphically, this data looks like Figure 2.4.1.2:
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Figure 2.4.1.2 Graph of Cost of Licenses versus Service Level
These same types of results can be computed based on 3, 9 and 12 months of usage data.
(See results of the Case Studies in Chapter 3)
2.4.1.1 License Usage Data Integrity Issues
Although I pulled hourly usage data for the same 9-12 months (depending on availability)
-- usually from July 2002 to July 2003-- for each software product, the CLS returned a
different number of data points for each. None of the data returned included every hour
requested, and it is possible that, as a result, the data does not represent the true usage. A
rough calculation suggests that for 6 months with 30 days in each month and 24 hours per
day, there should be 4320 data points. For the four case study products I received 3178
data points (74%) for one, 2641 data points (60% of the potential hours available) for
another, 2374 points (55%) for the third and only 10% for the fourth (This one also did
not have normally distributed data, so I did not make any cost conclusions for this
product. This will be discussed in Chapter 3.)
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Cost of Licenses
Ali
Furthermore, the available data only includes data up to the peak number of licenses. If
licenses were unavailable (i.e. there is a denial of service for the user), and there were one
or more engineers who needed a license at the time of a peak, this data was not recorded.
In other words, demand for licenses above the total number of licenses available is not
recorded. This could cause a skew in the data towards lower demand than was actually
experienced, because actual demand may have been more than actual usage during
periods of peak demand when all licenses were checked out. Fortunately, there were very
few times when all licenses were checked out, so this issue likely does not have an
impact on the data. I recommend, however, that Agilent commence collecting "stock
out" data to more accurately reflect demand in future applications of the model.
Finally, all of the usage estimates are based on historical data. There is no forecasting.
For the most part, this did not seem to matter, because there was not a major change in
average usage when comparing 3 months, 6 months or even a year of data. However, this
could be a problem in the future if there are large increases or decreases in license use.
Although Agilent knows that it needs to improve its forecasts of software tool usage, we
determined that this was outside the scope of my internship project. I nonetheless
recommend that Agilent consider developing a tool to forecast software tool usage (see
Chapter 4) that can be used as input to this model in the future.
2.4.1.2 Cost of Licenses Summary
There are five steps in determining cost of licenses at different service levels.
1. Collect historical usage data
2. Check for normality (if necessary, transform to normal)
3. Calculate the mean and standard deviation for the data set
4. Calculate the license needs at different service levels (Formula 2.4.1.1)
5. Multiply the license number by the cost per license to determine cost at different
service levels
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2.4.2 Cost of Unavailability (stock out)
For inventory control, a stock out is defined as a demand unit not being filled because the
stock is not available." This cost could include the cost of a lost sale, the cost of being
late in filling the demand and/or the cost to meet the demand in some other way. In this
case, the cost of a stock out is the cost to Agilent of the unavailability of a license when
the engineer requests it. This cost could theoretically range from nothing to the cost of
shipping a product late if its introduction were delayed by the unavailability of the
software. To better understand the cost of unavailability at Agilent, I came up with a
hypothesis about the components of "unavailability" cost, and tested my hypothesis by
interviewing Agilent managers and engineers. I then reviewed relevant literature to
further understand the cost implications.
2.4.2.1 Hypothesis: Profit Delay and Overtime Frustration
I hypothesized two extreme situations: in the most severe case, a lack of license could
prevent an engineer from completing his or her work, and result in a product launch
delay. This could potentially be quite expensive to the organization. On the other end of
the spectrum, the lack of a license could simply cause the engineer to have to work
overtime to make up for the lost time, and would be frustrating, but cost the organization
very little. I approximate this cost as if overtime had some negative value, even though
90% of the license users at Agilent are salaried, and thus don't receive overtime pay,
2.4.2.2 Engineers' Perspective
To learn about the real-life effects of license unavailability, I interviewed 30 engineers
from different business groups with electrical, mechanical and software backgrounds. I
created a questionnaire (see Appendix A) and set up phone meetings. I asked the
" Hopp, Wallace J., Spearman, Mark L, Factory Physics: 2"d Edition. McGraw-Hill Higher Education
2001 p. 78.
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engineers about their experiences with license unavailability, and what the effects of
unavailability had been or might be.
Only half of the engineers had actually experienced a stock out and most of these
engineers had outages before the Central Licensing System (CLS) was put in place. The
engineers who had experienced outages said that they never lasted more than a day, and
they never resulted in a product launch delay. However, the outages often resulted in
frustration and/or having to rearrange work schedules.
Even though half of the engineers had not actually experienced license unavailability, I
needed to understand its impact for analysis purposes. Therefore, I asked the engineers to
imagine the impact hypothetically. Their responses indicated that at some points in the
project, such as close to a product release, an unavailable license would directly impact
the product release date. However, it was possible to conclude, based upon their input,
that a couple of hours of outage would usually not have much of an effect on a product
launch. It would cause some frustration and rearranging of schedules, but 60% thought
that it would probably take an outage of two days to a week for license outages to impact
the schedule. Twenty percent believed that in the worst case half a day (four hours) to a
day of license outages could actually impact the schedule.
2.4.2.2.1 Conclusions from Interviews
Based on the input from the engineers, I made the following assumptions for the form of
the cost of unavailability curve. When licenses are unavailable 4 hours or more per
outage, I assume that the cost of unavailability includes both overtime (representing
engineer frustration and work rescheduling costs) and product launch delay costs. When
licenses are unavailable 4 hours or less per outage, I assume that the cost of unavailability
is only the cost of overtime, and that product launches will not be delayed. Note that this
is a conservative assumption, as only 20% of the engineers interviewed thought that
product launch delay could occur at the 4-hour delay level. A less conservative, yet still
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practical assumption would be that product launch delay costs kick in at two consecutive
days of unavailability per year. Although I do not show the results of such an analysis in
this thesis, this would cause Agilent to carry even fewer licenses.
2.4.2.3 Product launch delay: Literature Review
The engineers did relate in their interviews that when a task is on the critical path, and the
software that is necessary to complete the task is unavailable for 4 hours or more, the task
is delayed. This results in a slip in schedule. In order to understand the cost implication
of this delay in schedule, I consulted literature on the subject.
Many articles stress the negative implications of product launch delays. One McKinsey
study, from the early 1980s, that is quoted in almost every subsequent article on this
subject states, "high-tech products that came to market even 6 months late earned 33%
less profit over 5 years.'"2 , The article indicates that it makes more business sense to go
over budget on development costs because, according to the McKinsey study, "profits
were only reduced 4% when they came out on time but 50% over budget". The point is
further emphasized in a more recent Arthur D. Little study that said, "Exceeding the
launch time by 10% (which for a development period of 2 years is less than 3 months)
reduced total revenues by 25-30%"".
This often-quoted McKinsey study, originally written by Donald Reinertsen, summarizes
the effects based on studying the high-tech industry. Reinertsen becomes more specific
in later articles and books in which he states that for each product's market scenario, such
as a monopoly, or products with high switching costs, there are different costs of
delays.' 5 In the same book, as well as an article he published in 1999, he says that
knowing the cost of delay is extremely important, because it helps a company evaluate
12 Edward, Katherine, "Achieving Cycle-Time Excellence in the Global Economy: The Impact of Speed",
2001 AACE International Transaction, PM.12.2
13 Ibid
4 Ibid
15 Reinertsen, Donald, Managing the Design Factory: A Product Developer's Toolkit (Free Press: October
1997) p. 28
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trade-offs of speed, product performance etc. 16 Reinertsen specifically mentions that
companies need a business level cost of delay in order to decide when to add another
computer-aided design license. 17
Overall, it is clear that there are costs associated with delaying a product launch.
Different authors might offer varying costs, but there is no debate that delays are costly.
Furthermore, delaying a project results in more financial losses than when a company
exceeds research and development or production spending in an effort to stay on
schedule.
2.4.2.4 Overtime/Frustration
As mentioned earlier, more than 90% of the users of the software tools at Agilent do not
receive overtime compensation. However, there are cost implications of employees
working extra hours and, as a result, often becoming frustrated. Hourly workers typically
receive one and half times their pay (1.5X) for overtime. In order to also incorporate
frustration, I added an addition factor of 0.3X, for a total overtime/frustration factor of
1.8X (where X is the average U.S. engineer's salary). However, 30% of the engineers
live outside of the US and, for the most part, are paid less than the US wage. Overall,
this multiplier only serves as an estimate, but unless this factor was off by a factor of 5
(i.e., the right estimate was actually 9X), the outcome of the model is not sensitive to
these assumptions.
2.4.2.5 Revenue Loss from Product Launch Delay
Based on the literature review, and inputs from the engineering community at Agilent, I
assumed that more than four hours of software license unavailability causes product
16 Reinertsen, Donald, "How Much is Speed Really Worth?" Electronic Design, May 3, 1999 v47 p. 64F
17 Reinertsen, Don, Managing the Design Factory: A Product Developer's Toolkit (Free Press: October
1997) p. 190
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launch delays that result in profit losses. However, there is no proof that this cause and
effect relationship actually exists. There are many possible causes of product launch
delays such as time to overcome a technical challenge or a problem during
manufacturing. The cause and effect relationship between license unavailability and
product launch delays is more tenuous, even though the engineers and R&D management
believe it could exist. Engineers also mentioned that for certain products, if the launch is
delayed beyond the market window, the delay could result in missing the market
opportunity completely or losing a customer. Licenses would have to be unavailable for
a much longer amount of time than the service levels that the model incorporates, so the
model ignores this possibility.
If a license is unavailable and does cause a product delay, it would be difficult to
determine which product was actually delayed. Therefore, the model assumes that, in the
worst case, the license unavailability causes a delay for Agilent's highest revenue
generating product or, in the more likely situation, the average revenue-generating
product. I received the revenue per quarter for the highest and average product for
Agilent's largest product group, EPSG, but obviously these are just ballpark numbers as
the revenue for products changes each quarter.
The only available product information came in the form of revenue generated per
quarter. However, the cost of unavailability impacts profits, so for each scenario I
estimated a range of potential profits from 10-20% of revenue. Obviously, different
products have different goals, but this is a good estimate because it is the target for
Agilent overall and managers from the business groups concurred that it was appropriate
for most products. However, some products might generate more or less profit. Figures
2.4.2.5.1 and 2.4.2.5.2 show the range of profit loss for the highest revenue-generating
product and an average revenue-generating product.
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Figure 2.4.2.5.1 Profit Loss Range for Figure 2.4.2.5.2 Profit Loss Range for
Highest Revenue Generating Product Average Revenue Generating Product
2.4.2.6 Profit Loss: Ranges Based on Literature Review
The figures above assume that every hour of unavailability results in an hour of profit
loss and do not incorporate overtime/frustration costs. However, the literature study in
Section 2.4.2.3 does not state that this is the case. For example, the ADL study explains
that a 10% delay results in a 30% revenue loss, not a 100% profit loss.
A limitation of the literature study is that it relies on knowing the length of time that a
product is delayed beyond the original development cycle. The actual length of delay
will not be known until the end of the project, which is too late to determine license need.
In order to apply the study, in one version of the model, I just assume that the license
unavailability results in a 30% reduction in revenue, no matter what the delay actually is.
(See Figure 2.4.2.6.1 for the range of profit loss for the 30% of the highest revenue-
generating product.) Another version of the model assumes an immediate loss of profit,
so that every hour of delay results in an hour of profit loss. (See Figures 2.4.2.5.1 and
2.4.2.5.2) In the latter scenario, the cost of stock out is higher so would cause the model
to suggest that Agilent buy more licenses and carry more inventory and have a higher
service level than in the case in which the ADL hypothesis is applied.
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Figure 2.4.2.6.1 Profit Loss Range for 30% of Highest Revenue Generating Product
2.4.2.7 Cost of Unavailability: Summary of Profit Loss Scenarios
For each software tool, I examined 3 profit-losing cost of unavailability situations:
1. Loss of one hour of profit from Agilent's highest revenue generating product
for each hour of license unavailability. (Figure 2.4.2.5.1)
2. Loss of one hour of profit from Agilent's average revenue generating product
for each hour of license unavailability. (Figure 2.4.2.5.2)
3. Loss of 30% of hourly revenue from Agilent's highest revenue generating
product for each hour of license unavailability. (Figure 2.4.2.6.1)
2.4.2.8 Graphical Summary of Cost of Unavailability
Figure 2.4.2.8.1 summarizes the cost of unavailability graphically. The lowest line is the
stock out cost if there is only overtime/frustration and no revenue losses from product
launch delay. The top line shows what the costs would be if there was only revenue loss
and no overtime/frustration. In actuality, as explained in section 2.4.2.2.1, the expected
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cost of unavailability is a combination of overtime/frustration and revenue loss up until a
certain number of hours of outages per year. On this graph this transition point is shown
at 4 hours of unavailability per year. When the unavailability is less than 4 hours per
outage, the engineers can definitely make up lost time, and the license unavailability only
causes overtime and frustration. In other words, the expected cost is the same as the
overtime/frustration cost.
Cost of Unavailability per Hour
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Figure 2.4.2.8.1 Cost of Unavailability: Generic Construct
2.5 Model Output: Determining Total Costs
In order to determine the optimal number of licenses, the cost of licenses is added to the
cost of unavailability to calculate the total cost. Total cost is then calculated for various
service levels. The goal is to operate at the service level that has the lowest total cost.
I applied this approach to four development software tools; the results of which will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. For each of those, I determined the cost of licenses at
different service levels, using 3, 6, 9 and 12 (when available) months of data. I then
calculated the cost of unavailability under the three scenarios described above. Finally, I
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generated for each software tool three total cost curves, representing the three different
cost of unavailability assumptions. From this set of curves, for each software tool, I was
able to suggest an optimal number of licenses that Agilent should buy.
Figure 2.5.1 is an example of the set of cost curves generated for each tool. It uses 6
months of license usage data and the cost of unavailability scenario is the first one in
section 2.4.2.7. The graphs show costs in dollars on the y-axis and service levels and
corresponding license needs on the x-axis. The graph also displays three curves. These
incorporate the cost of unavailability for ranges of profit as percentages of revenue (as
shown, for example, in Figure 2.4.2.5.1).
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Figure 2.5.1 Total Cost vs. Service Levels
Agilent's goal is to operate at the lowest total cost. In this case, note that the three curves
have their lowest point at the same level - or close to the same level. Assuming that the
potential profit loss is 10% or 15% of revenue, then the lowest point on Figure 2.5.1
shows that Agilent should operate with 14 licenses at a 99.5% service level. If Agilent
assumes that it is making a 20% profit, then, according to that curve, it should operate
with 15 licenses at a 99.9% service level. The absolute total dollar difference between 14
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and 15 licenses on the 20% profit curve is less than $2000. The operating manager can
decide whether it's worthwhile to spend the extra money or whether the probability of
being on that curve is so small that it's not worthwhile.
One other curve that examines the worst case scenario for Agilent, meaning Agilent
would have to buy the most number of licenses in this case, is when license unavailability
always translates into profit loss and never into overtime frustration. The final curve,
with the sub-title "(HIGHEST PROFIT LOSS)" assumes that the potential profit loss is
the highest (20%) and that at every service level, the cost of unavailability translates into
product loss. At no point on this specific curve is overtime/frustration considered. This
curve is shown in Figure 2.5.2. In this case, Agilent should operate with 15 licenses at a
99.9% service level.
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Figure 2.5.2 Total Cost vs. Service Levels
Figures 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 are total cost graphs just based on 6 months of license usage and
scenario one from section 2.4.2.7. But, there are similar graphs for different periods of
license usage and the two other scenarios summarized in section 2.4.2.7.
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All of these different situations result in different total costs, and therefore, have different
implications for Agilent. The company can use all of this information to make a business
decision. For example, if the costs do not vary much between the cases, then the cost of
carrying extra licenses is relatively minor. Thus, Agilent might choose to carry more
licenses. On the other hand, if the cost of carrying more licenses is more significant, then
Agilent would err on the side of risking a stock out and carry fewer licenses.
For example, in the case above, the difference between the lowest point in all of the cost
curves is one license. Agilent might decide that it does not know which curve to operate
on, so it will buy an extra license in order to cover the worst case. Therefore, by
determining the cost of unavailability, and by knowing the cost of each license, Agilent
now has the information to determine whether it's fiscally worthwhile to add another
license to the pool or when it makes sense to take a license away. The results of the
model give all of this information in order to make the best decision.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the project and the method for applying supply chain methodology
to software licenses. It also explained the terminology used in this application. The next
chapter will apply this methodology to four different software products.
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Chapter 3: Case Studies
3.1 Introduction
I tested the methodology described in Chapter 2, by applying it to four different software
development tools that Agilent uses. The software tools that were chosen for analysis
represent a variety of products that engineers utilize for development, and each provides
unique insight into the applicability of the model. This chapter describes the assumptions
inherent in the model. It then gives detailed results for Case Study 1 and the key
learnings provided by Case Studies 2, 3, and 4.
3.2 Case Studies
I applied the methodology described in Chapter 2 to the following four products:
1. A $25K Printed Circuit Board (PCB) design tool (Case Study 1)
2. A $125K ASIC chip design tool (Case Study 2)
3. A $1600 software coding bug detection tool (Case Study 3)
4. A $1 1K PCB analysis tool used to do quality analysis at the end of PCB design (Case
Study 4)
I chose these products because they represent a broad range of costs and are used for a
range of purposes. They cover two electrical engineering products, chips and PCBs, and
software engineering. In addition, the first three tools are used during the design phase,
but the fourth tool is used to test a design and fix errors at the end of development.
I applied the same methodology to each software product. Therefore, the following
explains Case Study 1 in detail, but only describes the differentiating factors for the other
case studies. All the data and graphs in this section use hypothetical data to protect
Agilent's and the software suppliers' confidentiality. However, the data and graphs still
illustrate the important points of the model.
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3.2.1 Case Study 1: Printed Circuit Board (PCB) Design Tool 1
Agilent engineers and designers use this PCB design tool to create layouts of printed
circuit boards.
3.2.1.1 Cost of Licenses
Figure 3.2.1.1.1 displays a month of hourly license usage data for this tool. Each day
should have 24 distinct data points, representing the 24 hours in a day. However, these
24 points are not shown on this graph because license usage from hour to hour might be
the same. For example, on July 1, four hours during the day have 15 licenses checked
out, and another four hours have 17 licenses checked out etc. Therefore, every hour is
not distinct on this graph. In addition, some of the data is unavailable. (as discussed in
section 2.4.1.2) The graph also shows that there is lower usage on holidays (e.g., July
4 th) and weekends.
Usage data for Jul '03
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Figure 3.2.1.1.1 One month of license usage data
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The usage data collected spans from July 2002 - July 2003. During this time period
average hourly usage remained constant, except for higher usage from July - September
2002. Agilent management believes that the decrease in usage after September 2002 was
due to the employee reductions that occurred during this time. Figure 3.2.1.1.2 shows
that, as a result, the mean and variability and resulting license needs are relatively close
when comparing 3, 6 and 9 months of data, but are higher for 12 months.
Period Mean Standard Deviation
3-months 15.9 6.7
6-months 15.2 6.9
9-months 16.0 7.0
12-months 18.0 7.8
Figure 3.2.1.1.2 Mean and Standard Deviation for Case Study 1
Even though the average license usage and standard deviation is slightly different for
each time interval, the only interval that results in different license requirements is when
using 12 months of data. As a result, the cost of having these added licenses is more than
for 3, 6 or 9 months. Therefore, I used 12 months of data as an extreme case and 6
months of data to represent the more likely case. I also show results for 6 months of data
in order to highlight the difference in costs. Furthermore, for most contracts, Agilent can
renegotiate the number of licenses every 6 months, so it would be worthwhile to look at
data in this time interval.
As described in Section 2.4.1, the model requires that demand data be normally
distributed (or be transformable to a normal distribution.) For Case 1, demand was
normally distributed as shown in Figure 3.2.1.1.3. The bars in this graph represent the
number of times a given number of licenses were required during a 6-month period. The
solid line represents the shape of a normal distribution.
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Figure 3.2.1.1.3 Fit of Normal Distribution for 6 months of usage
Given that the demand data is normally distributed, I can calculate the mean and standard
deviation of the data as shown in Figure 3.2.1.1.2. Plugging the mean and standard
deviation into Formula 2.4.1.1, I can calculate the number of licenses required at each
service level as shown in Figure 3.2.1.1.4.
Case Study 1: License Requirements
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Figure 3.2.1.1.4 Licenses Required versus Service Level for 6-month Demand Data
The cost of each license is a constant ($25,000 in this case). The curve showing
number of licenses required (Figure 3.2.1.1.4) is thus easily transformed into the cost
of licenses by service level curve shown in Figure 3.2.1.1.5.
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Figure 3.2.1.1.5 License Cost versus Service Level for 6-month Demand Data
The number of licenses, and thus cost of licenses, data are exactly the same for 3-month
and 9-month demand data. Because average usage and usage variability were both higher
for the 12-month data, there are more licenses and higher license costs required for each
service level. The more variable the demand, the greater the number of licenses that will
be needed to provide any given service level. As shown in Figure 3.2.1.1.6, for 3, 6 and
9 months of data, a 99.99% SL requires 40 licenses at a cost of $757,000, but for 12
months of data, a 99.99% SL requires 46 licenses at a cost of $871,000,
Period Number of Cost of
Licenses Licenses
Required at
99.99%
Service Level
3-months 40 $757,000
6-months 40 $757,000
9-months 40 $757,000
12-months 46 $871.000
Figure 3.2.1.1.6: Number and Cost of Licenses by Length of Demand Data
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3.2.1.2 Total Costs
As explained in Chapter 2, the total costs are the summation of the license costs and the
costs of unavailability. The first three Total Cost graphs in this section will use 12
months of license usage and different cost of unavailability scenarios. The fourth one
will use 6 months of data as a comparison.
The most expensive cost of unavailability scenario is when the engineers are working on
the highest revenue generating product and each hour of unavailability results in an hour
of profit loss. The following Figure 3.2.1.2.1 represents this situation for PCB Design
Tool 1:
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Figure 3.2.1.2.1 Total Cost vs Service Level (Cost of Unavailability based on the highest
revenue generating product) using 12 -month usage data
The graph shows that different assumptions yield different results. For example,
assuming a 10% profit requires 38 (99.5% SL) licenses while the assumption of 15% or
20% requires 43 (99.96% SL). Finally, assuming that at every service level license
unavailability translates into a product launch delay, then the total costs are lowest at a
99.9% SL (42 licenses)
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Applying the ADL assumption to the highest generating revenue product (scenario 3 in
Section 2.4.2.7), while using the same period of usage 12 months for cost of licenses
data, results in the following:
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Figure 3.2.1.2.2 Total Cost vs Service Level (Cost of Unavailability: applying ADL
assumption to highest revenue generating product ) using 12 -month usage data
Applying the ADL assumption requires carrying fewer licenses. For example, assuming
a 10% or a 15% profit requires 35 (99% SL) licenses. Assuming a 20% profit or
assuming that at every service level license unavailability translates into a product launch
delay, both require 38 licenses. (99.95% SL)
The two scenarios above assume that a license is unavailable for an engineer that is
working on the highest revenue-generating product. The majority of engineers are
working on an average revenue-generating product (scenario 2 in section 2.4.2.7).
Therefore, the cost when a license is unavailable is much lower and so is the total cost, as
shown in the following graph:
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Figure 3.2.1.2.3 Total Cost vs Service Level (Cost of Unavailability based on the
average revenue generating product) using 12 -month usage data
In this scenario, all assumptions require 31 licenses (96% SL). One major difference in
this graph is that the service levels near the optimum point are lower than 99.95%. All
the curves only include profit loss for the cost of unavailability (no overtime/frustration
cost). Therefore, the "WORST CASE" lays directly over the "Totals (combined product
20% overtime)" curve; they both have the same values for the range shown here.
These three situations shown above demonstrate the effects of changing the cost of
unavailability scenarios. The graphs above all use 12 months of license usage data, but
for Case Study 1, there are also different results if I use 3/6/9 months of historical license
usage data. The following graph uses 6 months of data (which is the same as using 3 or 9
months) and has the same cost of unavailability assumptions as described in the first case
study (Figure 3.2.1.2.1):
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Figure 3.2.1.2.4 Total Cost vs Service Level (Cost of Unavailability based on the highest
revenue generating product) using 6 -month usage data
This case, assuming a 10% profit, requires 35 (99.9% SL) licenses instead of the 38
licenses that are needed when the model used 12 months of usage data. Furthermore,
assuming that at every service level, license unavailability translates into a product
launch delay, then the total costs are also lowest at a 99.9% SL (35 licenses) instead of 42
licenses. The data in the above graph uses more recent historical usage, and thus, seems
more indicative of the current situation. However, Agilent would have to decide if the 12
months of data is more likely to represent future usage than 3, 6 or 9 months.
3.2.1.3 Cost Implications
The graphs above illustrate that different assumptions have different implications.
Agilent now has the data to make a decision based upon which scenario it thinks most
represents reality and by comparing the cost for each situation.
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The PCB Design Tool 1 licenses each cost $25,000. Below is a summary comparing the
cost for "Total all profit loss (20%) WORST CASE" for the four scenarios described
above:
License Cost
Needs
Total Cost 1 (Figure 3.2.1.2.1) 42 1.05M
(12 months usage data, highest
revenue generating product)
Total Cost 2 (Figure 3.2.1.2.2) 38 0.95M
(12 months usage data, 30% of
highest revenue generating product)
Total Cost 3 (Figure 3.2.1.2.3) 31 0.53M
(12 months usage data, average
revenue generating product)
Total Cost 3 (Figure 3.2.1.2.4) 35 0.88M
(6 months usage data, highest
revenue generating product)
Figure 3.2.1.2.5 Comparison of Cost of Licenses for different Total Cost assumptions
These four examples have a cost range of $500,000. Thus, choosing which assumption to
use has substantial cost implications.
Agilent currently has 49 of these licenses at a cost of $1,225,000. Therefore, if Agilent
decides to use the assumptions in Total Cost 1 and the curve for "Total All profit loss
(20%) WORST CASE", the cost savings are $175,000 per each year of the contract.
For all the Total Cost curves presented in Figures 3.2.1.2.1 - 3.2.1.2.4, the number of
licenses needed range from 31 (Figure 3.2.1.2.3 all curves) to 43 (Figure 3.2.1.2.1 20%
combined profit and overtime curve) The license cost for this range is $775,000 to
$1,075,000. Therefore, Agilent can save between $150,000 and $450,000. For Case
Study 1, it is clear that Agilent buys more licenses than it needs.
3.2.2 Cost Implications for Case Studies 2-4
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As mentioned earlier, the same methodology was used for the other three case studies.
Applying the same assumptions as used for Total Cost 1 (Figure 3.2.1.2.1) and looking at
the "Total all profit loss (20%) WORST CASE", the results of Case Study 2 show that
Agilent needs 25 licenses, but has 38 licenses, for a total savings of $1.6M. For Case
Study 3, Agilent needs 51, but has 52, for a savings of $1600. The results of Case Study
4 are inconclusive (as will be discussed in section 3.3.2.2), but it seems that Agilent does
not need to reduce licenses for this software product.
3.3 Key Learning from Case Studies 2, 3, 4
Case Study 1 served as a template for the other three case studies. I chose the other case
studies to serve as a contrast to Case Study 1 and provide further insight into the model.
There are three major points that were learned by applying the model to these case
studies:
1. The model shows that there is an insignificant difference in usage data among the
different time intervals (i.e. 3, 6, 9 or 12 months of data)
2. The model provides limited insight for usage data that is not normal or
transformable to normal
3. The model aligns best with contracts in which Agilent determines how many
licenses to purchase and pays for that number, regardless of use.
3.3.1 License usage time range
Before creating the model, the intuitive approach led me to look at different time
intervals, because typically different time lengths have wider changes in demand and
increased variability. However, this did not prove true. As described in Case Study 1,
historical license usage data resulted in the same cost of license curves when using 3, 6,
or 9 months of data. Furthermore, for the other 3 case studies, there was no difference in
average hourly usage when comparing 3, 6, 9 or 12 months of data.
47
Although during the year that I extracted the data Agilent had large employee reductions,
overall, the usage data was still not sensitive to time, or, except in case study 1, to
fluctuations in employee headcount. (See further discussion in Chapter 4) Thus, at this
point, because the license usage data is difficult to obtain, in order to save time, the
employee responsible for collecting the data could only extract three months of data.
(This time interval proved to be the same as collecting usage data for 6 or 9 or 12 months
for three out of four case studies) Furthermore, Agilent can only change the number of
licenses it carries every 4 to 6 months. Therefore, it is not worthwhile to recalculate cost
of licenses versus service level more than every 6 months.
3.3.2 The normal distribution assumption
As discussed in section 2.4.1, the model applies best when the data is normally
distributed or transformable to normal. Case Study 1 was the only product that had
normally distributed usage data, which made the calculations straightforward. The usage
data for Case Studies 2 and 3 was right-tailed as shown in Figure 3.3.2.2.1.
Number of
times that
number of
licenses was
requested
Number of Licenses Requested
Figure 3.3.2.2.1 Example of distribution for Case Studies 2 and 3
The solid line, which is the shape of a normal curve, shows that the normal distribution
inaccurately fits the usage data. Specifically, for Case Studies 2 and 3 the skew and
kurtosis values were not close to zero.
However, for Case Studies 2 and 3, it was possible to transform the data to normal,
calculate the cost of licenses at different service levels and then transform the results back
to the original scale (as described in Section 2.4.1). The picture serves as a visual check.
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After applying the optimal exponent to the original usage data, the transformed data
distribution looked like:
Number of
times that
number of
licenses was
requested
Number of Licenses Requested
Figure 3.3.2.2.2 Example of transformed distribution for Case Studies 2 and 3
The usage data for Case Study 4, on the other hand, was not normally distributed and
cannot be transformed to normal. This is the case because Agilent only owns five
licenses of the software product. In addition, the engineers only use the licenses at the
end of each PCB design, and therefore, the usage pattern is cyclical. There are certain
months when only 1 or 2 licenses are used and other months when all 5 are used.
Therefore, any assumption of a continuous distribution is tenuous. The raw data does
appear to be similar to a Poisson distribution, so I compared the Poisson probabilities to
the ones observed in the usage data.
Due to the Poisson distribution, I could not calculate the service level for any number of
licenses, but I could determine that Agilent currently has enough licenses to operate at a
99% service level. The distribution also made it impossible to calculate total costs
curves.
The analysis for Case Study 4 revealed that both the usage pattern and the number of
licenses contribute to the resulting distribution. It is not clear how many licenses are
needed in order to assume a normal or transformable to normal distribution. However, as
a rule of thumb, Agilent should not apply the model to software products that have less
than 10 licenses.
3.3.3 Contract implications
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The contract between Agilent and the software supplier influences the applicability of the
model. The model was built to directly correlate with the contract terms in Case Study 1
(which has the same terms as Case Study 4). For Case Study 1, Agilent estimates the
number of licenses needed and then pays for each one over the period of the contract. As
explained earlier, unused licenses cost Agilent money. Therefore, the model optimized
the license needs and, in this case, determined that Agilent has too many licenses. At the
next opportunity, Agilent can stop spending extra money for licenses it does not need.
Case Study 2 has similar contract terms to Case Study 1. As mentioned in section 3.2.2,
following the same reasoning as in Case Study 1, Agilent has 13 extra licenses ($1.6M)
However, there is one slight modification in the contract for Case Study 2. The provider
of this software gave Agilent 13 extra licenses for a period of time as a bonus for the
business and in hopes that Agilent would end up paying for these licenses after the free-
trial period ended. Therefore, according to the model, at this time, Agilent is really not
paying for extra licenses. The results do show Agilent that after the free-trial period, if
the business is the same; Agilent does not need to buy extra licenses.
The software code bug detection tool, analyzed in Case Study 3, has different contract
terms than the ones for Case Study 1 and 2. In this case, Agilent pays for the peak
number of licenses used over the last three month period. Once again in section 3.2.2, it
states that if the contract were the same as Case Study 1, then Agilent would be paying
for one extra license at a cost of $1600.
However, Agilent paid for peak licenses over the three month period, and the peak usage
was only 35 licenses. The model shows that for this software product, the terms of the
license agreement save Agilent money. If Agilent paid for 51 licenses, the optimum
number, instead of 35, the peak usage, it would pay an extra $26,000 per year over the
length of the contract.
It seems that Agilent receives a good deal for Case Study 3. If peak usage is less than the
optimal number of licenses, then Agilent might want to renegotiate contracts for these
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cases. For Case Study 2, the software supplier convinced Agilent that it receives a bonus
during the free-trial period. In actuality, Agilent does not need the free extra licenses.
Overall, the model provides useful insight even if the contract terms differ from Case
Studies 1 and 4.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter provided the results of the model for the four case studies. It showed that
different assumptions are worth examining because they produce a large range of cost
implications. (ex: Figure 3.2.1.2.5) It also explained that the results do not change by
modifying the time interval, that the model relies on using normally-distributed or
transformable-to-normal data, and that the contract terms that require holding inventory
provide the most insight. The next chapter will examine the future use of the model.
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Chapter 4: Future Use of Models and Benchmarking
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned earlier, the model does not include forecasting in order to determine future
license usage. This chapter will briefly describe potential usage indicators and methods
for forecasting. It will also provide examples of processes that other companies use to
manage their central licensing.
4.2 Forecasting
There are different events that can affect software license usage such as a change in the
number of engineers, an increase or decrease in new product introductions (NPI), the
degree of complexity of the new products, or a shift in market segment focus. Ideally,
Agilent could correlate the impact of each of these on license usage and create a forecast
model based on this. The difficulty lies in collecting the appropriate data.
For example, retrieving employment data seemed relatively easy and AES management
believed it would have the strongest correlation to license usage.18 The total engineering
headcount and some information on the number of engineers in each discipline was
available. However, correlating the correct employees to the correct software tools posed
a problem. Some employees fall under the heading of electrical engineering but use the
mechanical engineering software tools. In fact, there are about 500 employees
categorized as mechanical engineers, but there are more than 1000 users of the
mechanical engineering software.19
18 The results from the case studies presented in Chapter 3, showed that even though there were more than
15% reductions in headcount during the data collection period, it did not affect the license usage. The
exception is for Case Study 1, in which the results using 12 months of data differed from 3, 6, and 9 months
of historical data. Overall, employee numbers might correlate, but it might take larger than 15% changes to
affect the results of the optimization model. In any case, the point of section 4.2 is not to say that these
correlations definitely exist, but that these are some of the components that might be correlated to data
usage. Furthermore, this section is explaining some of the challenges in building a statistical model.
19 Keeley, Ron, Centralized Representative for Mechanical Engineering at Agilent. E-mail dated 8-19-03.
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The other challenge is that, in the best case, the license usage data only exists for the last
18 months. So, even if the engineering data could be categorized appropriately, it is
difficult to see trends over a short period. Furthermore, the headcount data is rolled up by
month, but the usage data for most software fluctuates greatly over a month. An average
for the month would not truly represent the data. Another approach could be to correlate
engineer headcount with maximum usage in a month or another more representative
statistic.
Even though the above demonstrates the challenges of forecasting based on statistical
correlations, it would not be an impossible task. Agilent could create a process to ensure
that the correct data is collected so that correlation can be determined. Once the
relationships between license usage and different events have been established, Agilent
could monitor the relevant indicators. When significant changes in the trigger points
occur, AES can run the optimization model, developed for this project, with the future
usage data and determine license needs. Forecasting models would serve as a powerful
complement to this optimization model.
4.3 Review Process
In the absence of formal forecasting models, AES can still establish a schedule for
periodically updating the model. This schedule can be based on known factors. For
example, some software contracts have stipulations on when Agilent can remix the types
of licenses it owns. Usually, the contract allows Agilent to change the license mix every
quarter or every six months. Therefore, if Agilent cannot make any changes until the
established time has passed, it is not worthwhile to optimize the model on a more
frequent basis.
Furthermore, as discussed in section 3.3.2.1, even though there were employee reductions
and business changes during the last year, there were not large changes in the usage data.
Only Case Study 1 had different results when analyzing 12 months of usage data instead
of 3, 6 or 9 months. Additionally, none of the case studies showed changes when
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comparing 3 months to 6 months of usage data. Given that usage patterns were
consistent across the sampled time intervals, it still seems reasonable for AES not to run
the optimization model more than every 6 months. This cycle also fits in with the
contract conditions.
4.4 Benchmarking
Other companies have also struggled with forecasting and determining license needs. As
part of the project, I discussed methods that other companies use. I met with members of
the Central Enterprise Licensing User Group that work for Intel, Honeywell and
Motorola. None of these companies developed processes based on cost trade-offs, but
they did have other methods that provide learning.
Honeywell has a program called Centralized Engineering Application Licenses (CEAL)
to manage software licenses across the corporation. One metric this group tracks is
license utilization, which Honeywell defines as used divided by used plus queued.
(Honeywell has a system set up so that if a license is not available when requested, the
engineer can put his/her name in a queue and will be given a license when it is available)
Honeywell management established a goal that license usage should be at 98%
utilization. The company tracks this metric on a monthly basis and buys enough licenses
to meet this goal. According to a negotiator in the CEAL group, this goal was set
arbitrarily.2 o
Motorola also set an arbitrary goal of ensuring that users do not encounter denials on
more than 9% of the period days. 2 1 For example, if during a three month period license
usage for a software product hit the peak number on eleven days (equals approximately
12%), Motorola would investigate whether it needed to buy more licenses. Employees
20 Stanley, Rachel, License Administrator Specialist. Honeywell. E-mail dated 8-19-03.
21 Griffith, Dan, Manager, Comprehensive Software Asset Management at Motorola. E-mail dated 12-2-
03.
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on the Comprehensive Software Asset Management (CSAM) team would look at this
peak usage, and would base the decision to buy more on trends such as whether the peak
usage all occurred recently or all happened in the first month.
They would also check if there are opportunities to improve utilization of the available
licenses. In order to do this, Motorola looks at metrics such as the global locations where
usage occurred. If there were times of low peak usage, Motorola would also evaluate
whether engineering jobs could be scheduled during these times.
Overall, Motorola has a strategy to collect multiple metrics in order to plan for the future
and manage software licenses. Each month, CSAM reviews peak usage, effective peak
usage, and usage by locations. The CSAM group also meets with the users in order to
gauge engineering direction. In addition, the group makes this data available to the
software users so that they can make decisions based on metrics.
Intel also looks at past data to determine license needs, but Intel stressed the formal
review process that it had with the user community. Most companies meet with the
engineering management to ask about future usage, but Intel actually has the managers
create documented forecasts. Putting the numbers in writing creates accountability and
forces management to thoughtfully determine future needs.
This significant management involvement in the license forecasting process makes the
engineers more willing to accept license unavailability. None of the companies
intentionally want to delay a project based on license unavailability, but Intel seemed
more willing to have temporary outages than did Agilent, Honeywell, or Motorola.
Denials seemed to be more of an accepted part of the system than at other companies.
The attitudes of the companies showed that the license strategy is not just based on
numbers, but is also a result of the organizational environment and culture. All the
companies that I met with had a technology focus and wanted to use software tools to
enhance the innovative process. The companies did want to manage the license program
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and reduce costs; however, due to the importance of continual technical achievement,
cost was certainly mentioned less than availability.
Each company also had specific processes for the licensing program that coincided with
the company strategy. For example, Motorola's focus on metrics fits right in with the
company's adherence to the principles of Six Sigma. As mentioned earlier, Intel seemed
a little bit more accepting of license outages. Although Intel also relies on technical
advancement, its core competency is manufacturing. Thus, the company might cater
more to the employees in manufacturing than to the ones in the design community.
It is clear that many companies are struggling with similar issues. In addition, companies
focus on different issues depending on such aspects as the organizational environment.
There is much that each company can learn from other companies' approaches.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter showed the challenges and benefits of eventually creating a formal
forecasting method. In the meanwhile, a review process can be initiated to have a regular
update of the model. The chapter also described aspects of Honeywell's, Motorola's and
Intel's software licensing programs. The next chapter will examine the impact of
Agilent's organizational environment on the project.
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Chapter 5: The Organizational Environment and its Impact
5.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 4, a company's strategy and culture influence its software
licensing program. This can be shown in more detail by outlining the organizational
situation at Agilent and explaining its impacts on the development of this project and on
the future use of the model's results. During my internship, I was able to assess how the
economic environment, the structure of the organization, the political power and the
culture all affected the project. This chapter will describe these observations as well as
reflections on the use of the tools described in the Sloan Leadership Model.
5.2 Economic Climate
By the end of the summer of 2003 (the start of this internship), Agilent had endured nine
consecutive unprofitable quarters. Consequently, the number one objective of the
company was to return to profitability. This involved difficult measures such as major
reductions in traveling and lay-offs. Up until 2001, Agilent employees had never
experienced lay-offs. When the CEO, Ned Barnholdt, announced the first round to
employees over the PA system, he said, "This is the toughest decision of my career, but
we've run out of alternatives." The first two rounds cut more than 8000 employees, and
to date, through this program, the workforce has been reduced by more than 30%.
Agilent's economic situation and associated actions had a negative impact on morale.
Although the employees knew lay-offs were necessary and even supported them, it was
still difficult to remain motivated in this environment. Furthermore, employees felt
sympathy towards ones who had lost their jobs and also felt uncertainty towards their
own future careers.
This economic climate led to creating projects in order to examine the necessity of
current spending. The idea to analyze software expenditures by applying supply chain
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methodology was one of these projects. At the onset of the project, AES assumed the
current approach adequately determined license needs. However, the group thought that
a quantitative method could improve the accuracy of license purchases. It was possible
that the results would show that Agilent actually needed more licenses, but at least this
conclusion would have been determined by a more rigorous analysis than the current
method. In the end, the results proved that Agilent can actually reduce the number of
licenses, which aligns well with the current economic pressures.
Although Agilent's effort to become profitable might create necessary and cost effective
projects, the current economic situation does pose a challenge to implementation. For
example, the optimization models developed for this project will require updates and will
be more beneficial if they are applied to additional software products. However, with the
employee reductions, people are feeling strained to sustain existing programs, let alone
take on new ones. Management will need to help employees establish appropriate
priorities during these challenging times.
5.3 Culture: Collegial and Loyal
As mentioned above, Agilent had never imposed lay-offs since its creation (Originally,
Agilent was part of Hewlett-Packard, which did not have layoffs either.) Many
employees of HP and Agilent believed they had a non-verbal contract with the company
for employment for life. 2 This created a culture of loyalty and trust; it also allowed
people to work together for long periods of time and develop friendships.
Employees remain at Agilent for large portions of their career, and people are proud of
their employment length. I had many conversations that started with comments such as
"10 years ago..." or "I have only been here 10 years, so I don't know as much as he
does..." A long length of employment results in automatic credibility.
22 Gibbons, Dr. Robert, Sloan School at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Course: Strategy and
Organization, Spring 2003.
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Due to this substantial period of employment at Agilent, deep relationships and personal
networks develop. Consequently, as a new intern, I had to tap into others' networks to
get needed information. Furthermore, people spent time protecting the co-workers in
their network. Co-workers cautioned before giving me names by saying, "That person is
really busy..." or "I'm not sure whether I should put you in touch with him..." and even,
slightly jokingly, "Don't tell him that I gave you his name." I believe that some of these
excuses were because people are actually busy, but they are also because employees
value their networks and are more successful because of them. Therefore, they do not
want to jeopardize their relationships.
Another symbol of this relationship-laden culture was the guidance I always received to
contact people by phone first instead of by e-mail. One co-worker said, "Call them first,
because then they'll warm up to you". Agilent, like many large technology companies,
has employees spread throughout the world. Even so, they make an effort to develop
relationships at least through the phone. Employees perceived e-mail as too impersonal
for initial contact.
This dispersed employee base and the desire to maintain relationships caused Agilent
employees to establish unique venues to promote more intimate interactions. At a staff
meeting when employees were asked to give updates on their work, some would make
the verbal report and then share a personal anecdote. They would tell stories about a
recent illness or a new baby. With the ability to share media through the web, one co-
worker even showed a picture from her last vacation and thanked people for covering for
her while she was away.
Another venue was a creative holiday party. The current economic climate restricted
travel, but AES employees still wanted to have the party. So, they created a virtual one.
Employees sat at their own work location, dialed into a conference call and talked while
they drank their favorite beverage.
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These strong relationships and the maturity of the workforce also produced a high-trust
environment. This made managing a global group easier, especially without the ability to
travel. In addition, management had no problem with telecommuting. More than half the
AES team worked from home all of the time or sporadically. One manager said to me,
"All that matters is that the work gets done."
I also noticed that the managers in AES trusted their employees to make decisions. For
example, the software license negotiators were responsible for major contracts. Their
manager let them conduct all the negotiations, determine license needs, and secure the
contracts. The manager of this group told me that the negotiators were so
knowledgeable, she would only get involved if they needed help and to reduce any
bureaucratic obstacles.
For the most part, these already-established networks and global employee base did not
negatively impact my ability to get the information needed. However, it did make it
more challenging. For example, when I interviewed engineers about the implications of
license unavailability, half refused to meet with me or would accept a meeting and not
attend. When I asked co-workers to send out a note to their contacts to say that it is
worthwhile to meet with me, more engineers were willing. This was less efficient, but it
seemed to be the required method.
New employees do not have the built-in respect from length of employment nor the
personal networks, so they have to learn how to work through other people's networks. It
could become frustrating if employees feel that they have to put in their time before they
really can advance or be respected. On the other hand, this collegial environment
produced positive results and made Agilent a great place to work.
5.4 Politics: The Powerful Development Engineers
As mentioned earlier, Agilent's mission statement is, "to provide solutions and
technologies that revolutionize the way people live and work." Agilent also lists
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23innovation as one of its values. To accomplish these goals, Agilent relies on its
development engineers. Thus, it is no surprise that these engineers hold a lot of power
within the company.
This power structure was obvious even from the half-day plant tour that my classmates
and I attended six months before this internship. During the tour, we heard a talk from an
employee who managed supply chain programs at Agilent. He talked about the
challenges of reducing inventory and the number of different supplies in each product.
He said that many products even had customized screws; this was taking the value of
innovation to an extreme. When I jokingly asked whether the company emphasized
technological achievements so much that it almost did not care whether it could actually
make money on the product, he smiled and nodded his head affirmatively.
Of course, the economic climate highlighted the need for more focus on operations and
costs, but this employee still described programs in this area as a struggle. He also said
that employees with MBAs received less respect than employees with PhDs. Whether
this was just his perception or truth, these types of comments definitely highlighted the
tension between business and engineering.
This tension showed itself when I was interviewing employees to determine the cost of
unavailability for my model. There was a clear difference in opinion between managers
and engineers involved in finance versus ones in development. Employees in finance
would explain how it is not possible for license unavailability to cause product delays.
They told me that there are so many events that could cause delays, such as technological
obstacles, manufacturing challenges, or parts not being available. Licenses would have
to be unavailable for weeks for it to affect a product launch. Otherwise, engineers could
definitely make up the time. Even after I interviewed more than 30 people in different
areas of the company, a co-worker, who had a Finance background, told me that he could
not believe the model because the cost of unavailability could not be equated with lost
revenue due to a product launch delay.
23 Value Statement from www.agilent.com
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On the other hand, managers and engineers in the development groups would tell me that
even an hour of license unavailability could jeopardize the launch date. One manager
said that license unavailability is totally unacceptable; engineers must have these
software tools at all times. These comments sharply contrasted with the ones from the
finance employees, and I had to assess all of these opinions when making final
determinations on cost of unavailability.
This power struggle created other challenges during the project. It quickly became
apparent that there is a power structure even within the engineering ranks, and the top
position is held by the electrical engineers (EEs). When I was setting up interviews, the
mechanical (MEs) and software engineers (SWEs) were more willing to meet than the
EEs. At first, I thought this was due to the relationship between my contacts who
introduced me to the MEs and the SWEs. However, my conduit to the EEs had just as
good a relationship.
One of the my co-workers said, "Of course the MEs are more willing to meet you and are
nicer, because MEs were originally EEs who couldn't make it and so they're just regular
guys." I hardly agree, but I realize that this represents some of the attitudes of people in
the company. And, many of the EEs believed this about themselves. One in particular,
answered the phone when I called and seemed interested in contributing his ideas to my
project. About two minutes into the conversation, he started yelling at me that he did not
have the time to talk about software licenses; he has more important things to do. Then
he hung up on me.
The attitude was shocking. I interpret it as being a result of the superiority complex that
the company fosters for EEs, but also due to the added stress from the economic climate
and workforce reductions. When I relayed the story to my co-workers, most found it
unacceptable, and somewhat surprising. However, they did concur that EEs have the
most power, because they are responsible for many of Agilent's products.
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This acceptance of the engineer as king will definitely impact the potential
implementation of the results of the model. Two of the case studies showed that Agilent
has more licenses than needed. But, reducing the licenses would mean that there would
be more license unavailability. Engineers might have to wait for licenses or rearrange
their work hours. This would inconvenience the employees that have the political power.
And, this political power does not just exist because of pure politics; Agilent relies on the
engineers for technical innovation. Furthermore, as pointed out by the manager of
Quality and Engineering Services (the group that AES reports to), creative ideas do not
happen on demand. He rhetorically asked, "what if an engineer thinks of something and
the license in unavailable, and s/he cannot get in the same mindset when it does become
available?"
If AES does decide to implement the methodology described in this thesis, it should gain
buy-in from the engineering community before implementation. I do think that the
business groups are looking for opportunities to save money, and this might be a way to
accomplish this goal. However, AES treats these groups as customers, and in order to
maintain a good relationship, ensuring (and believing) that the benefits of license
reduction are worthwhile is imperative.
5.5 Structure: Decentralized Groups
The organizational structure at Agilent facilitates the innovative process. Agilent has
decentralized groups that are each responsible for their own profit and loss.
Decentralization fosters speed and flexibility, so groups can move faster with
technological developments. On the other hand, it does reduce opportunities for shared
learning and copying best-practiced methods across organizations. Agilent deals with
both of these components of decentralization, but its goals are output and ingenuity, not
collaboration. Therefore, a decentralized structure is the best way to accomplish this.
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24The McKinsey Quarterly explained that decentralization not only creates a faster-
moving organization, but it also allows for "atomization". Atomization helps diverse
businesses with different products and in various industries to identify and pursue
opportunities in a unique way. In order to gain the benefits of decentralization, a
company requires a certain culture, talent, and long-term commitment. Agilent has
committed itself to this organizational structure and aligns the culture, goals and politics
appropriately.
Decentralization at Agilent allows each group to operate independently and to decide on
which technology and products to pursue. This structure creates autonomous groups, and
I believe that this independence could even be seen at the individual level. For instance,
as described in the sections 5.3 and 5.4, the development engineers and the program
managers are given a lot of responsibility and can make important decisions. Workers in
centralized organizations, on the other hand, often have to receive multiple layers of
approval before an idea is accepted. Agilent has a focus on innovation, so this structure
empowers the individual's creative process.
On the other hand, Agilent does realize that there are some processes that should be
managed centrally. Therefore, as described in Section 1.4, Agilent has centralized
support groups, such as Finance, IT, and AES that make up the Global Infrastructure
(GI). These groups report to the Chief Operations Officer.
Centralizing these groups reduces redundant efforts and saves Agilent money.
Coordinating services, according to a 2001 Andersen/akris.com study, return a payback
in 1-2 years for 29% studied and in 3-4 years for 77% of those interviewed. The study
also showed that 34% of the companies in the study had a 20-40% headcount savings. 26
24 Barnett, F. William, Jr., Berland, Terrace P. "Strategic Thinking on the Front Lines", The McKinsey
Quarterly, Spring 1999.
25 McReynolds, Scott; O'Brien, Brian, "Earning Pressures Boost Shared Servies", Financial Executives
Jan-Feb 2002 v18 i1.
26 Ibid.
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However, centralized groups within a decentralized company encounter challenges. For
example, the members of the centralized groups try to coordinate efforts of employees
within different business groups. The employees in the business groups are accustomed
to their independence; they also do not have the incentive to compromise for people in
another business group because they are mostly judged on only their own group's
performance.
As a result, the employees in the GI groups need to utilize their sphere of influence and
networks when convincing people to coordinate for the good of the whole company.
Originally, AES had to use these skills when creating the centralized licensing program.
Managers and engineers in the business group did not want to share licenses across the
organization, because then they would have less control and possibly have unavailability
when they needed a license. However, AES ensured that it would not compromise
service and that the cost savings were too tremendous not to pursue a centralized
approach.
My interviews confirmed that AES delivered on its promise. The engineers said that the
centralized program actually reduced licenses, because the infrastructure was better. It
also eliminated the need for individuals in the group to negotiate contracts, which saved
the group time. And, most importantly, it saved more than 30% of the total license costs.
The promises made at the onset of the program were a necessary action of a centralized
group trying to receive buy-in from decentralized organizations. These promises,
however, make it unpopular for AES to go back to these groups to tell them that the
service level might actually be too high. As described in Section 5.4, I even found that
talking about potential license unavailability often was not received well. Groups do
threaten that if the service declines, they can always go back to managing licenses for
themselves. This might be a local optimum, but is certainly not a global one.
At this point it is probably too expensive for each group to replicate the central function,
but the threat mentioned above puts the onus on AES to have a strong sales pitch in order
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to make the groups follow the results of the model. AES might want to sell the program
by mentioning that for some products Agilent has more licenses than it will ever use.
The amount of waste might resonate with the engineers. AES can also propose that it
will pass on the cost savings to the groups' bottom-line as it did when it initiated central
licensing.
5.6 Inventing: the common denominator
As I observed on the plant tour, Agilent thrives and succeeds because of great technical
inventions. Its organizational processes foster this goal: the loyal and collegial culture
empowers people to take responsibility and invent, the power lies with the engineers who
create future products, and finally, a decentralized organizational structure increases
speed and allows for autonomous organizations to make the best decisions about which
future technology path to pursue.
5.7 Interning in this organization
The lenses of culture, politics and structure, used above, provide one way to analyze an
organization, and the Sloan Leadership Model gives another. The Sloan Leadership
Model provides a framework to achieve change within an organization. This model
requires one to use the skills of Sensemaking, Relating, Visioning and Inventing.2 7 These
are described as the following: Sensemaking: learning about an organization, the
business climate and culture; Relating: building relationships; Visioning: creating a plan
and getting support; and Inventing: change and innovation. The following will describe
examples of employing these steps.
As an intern, working at Agilent for six months, I had to immediately use my
sensemaking skills to become aware of the culture, politics and structure in order to
accomplish my project objectives. For example, I quickly learned about the people
27 Ancona, Deborah, Malone, Thomas, Senge, Peter, and Wanda Orlikowski, "The Sloan Leadership
Model," Draft manuscript, Sloan School of Management, 2003.
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networks, and realized that these were critical to tap into in order to obtain the
information needed.
I next had to use my relating skills to find co-workers that could serve as allies and help
connect me to others. I have a natural inclination to create relationships with co-workers
and to utilize these to accomplish my work. Because of Agilent's collegial culture, I
made an extra effort to meet with as many co-workers as possible face to face. For
example, in the second week I drove to an office two hours away to meet with key
customers and stakeholders.
Due to the timeline of my internship, I also developed relationships by offering
employees something in return. Many co-workers bought-in just because they were
curious to see what my analysis would offer. I also realized that my co-workers believed
in the AES project management program, and my personal need to organize and plan fit
right in with the objectives of the PM program. If I followed the program, which would
just be utilizing a strength that I already had, people would be impressed with this effort,
automatically learn about my project through the PM communication process, and be
more willing to help me. I would then gain their respect, and they would feel
comfortable connecting me with their networks. This plan worked.
These relating skills also made me aware early on in the project that there were some co-
workers and people within the business groups who did not support my project. Even
though I have a tendency to try to please as many as possible, I decided that in order to
finish my project in six months, I could not satisfy everyone. However, I did not want to
completely ignore the non-supporters. Instead of relying on my natural tendencies to
align all parties from the beginning, I invented a different approach. I went back to some
of the non-supporters midway through the project to review the results to date. Some of
them then realized that even if they did not agree with all the components of the project,
they could still find something useful in one of the parts.
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This strategy proved successful. I did not get waylaid from the beginning or become
frustrated because I could not please everyone. On the other hand, mid-way through the
internship, most of the key stakeholders believed the project would deliver valuable
information.
The above example did not rely on my natural talents, but the one described below did
utilize my strengths as well as the idea of visioning from the leadership model. As
mentioned earlier, I operate best with a plan in mind and seeing the end objective. Less
than two months into the project, I presented to my stakeholders graphical
representations, with hypothetical data, of the envisioned results of the project.
Therefore, very early on in the project the key players knew what information the model
would give them. Furthermore, the framework was now established, and I could spend
the rest of my time filling in the details of the model.
The above gave examples of the ways I used the insights gained from the Sloan
Leadership Model to approach the project. The process is not always linear and requires
going back and forth between the different steps in order to have the best results.
5.8 Reflection
Throughout the project, I received positive feedback on the work I was doing. At the end
of the internship, I had completed all of the objectives that I described in the initial
project plan. Furthermore, my model had produced results that could save Agilent
money. AES was satisfied with the information received and looked forward to
implementing the recommendations.
However, the actual implementation will be mostly determined by the organizational
environment at Agilent. The model results, which show that Agilent should reduce
licenses, contrast with the focus on technology, and the resulting culture, politics and
structure. The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that although a quantitative
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perspective is useful, the creation of it and the implementation completely relies on
people and working within an organization.
5.9 Conclusion
The organizational lenses and the Sloan Leadership Model provide a framework to
analyze a company. These insights help with the implementation of a project such as the
one completed for this thesis. I found these tools particularly useful because my timeline
was short and I needed the information gained from them to be successful. The next
chapter will give final recommendations and lessons learned.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This thesis explained the supply chain model that was developed for software licenses
and showed the results of four case studies. It also discussed the organizational behavior
and the impact of this on the project. This chapter will review the model and give
recommendations for next steps. It will then outline take-away lessons from the overall
project.
6.2 Summary of the model
Applying supply chain principles of service level, inventory and stock outs to software
licenses provide a quantitative method for determining license needs. The methodology
analyzes the cost trade-offs of holding inventory versus having license unavailability. It
then allows the user to identify the optimal level of service.
The model has a few key characteristics. It works best in situations in which the data is
normally distributed or transformable to normal and the software contract involves
paying for a certain number of licenses regardless of actual use. It assumes that license
denials translate into overtime/frustration and/or profit loss due to product launch delays,
depending on the hours of unavailability. The model can still be applied without the
assumption or scenario described above, but the results are less powerful.
In order to show the cost implications of various scenarios, I tested the model using
different assumptions. For example, I assumed a range of potential profit losses for
license unavailability. By doing so, management will be able to decide which
assumptions are the most relevant and use the results of that scenario. The cost
implications varied largely between the situations, but overall, they all showed that
potential exists for significant cost savings.
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6.3 Recommendations
Agilent now has the results of applying the model to four of its software products. As
discussed, this information provides useful insight, and, if applied, can save Agilent
money. Furthermore, Agilent has options to gain further benefit from the model. Below
are a couple of suggestions on how to proceed. The recommendations are not exclusive
and can stand-alone or be done concurrently.
1. Implement the results from the four case studies in the next negotiation
period. This would only require reducing the licenses for Case Study 1 and
not adding any more licenses for Case Study 2 when the bonus period ends.
In this way, Agilent can monitor the effects of having fewer licenses and,
possibly, gain more confidence in this approach.
2. Determine the cost implications of a company-wide or product-specific
service level and discuss with internal business partners. This approach just
utilizes the part of the model that evaluates cost of licenses, so it ignores any
disagreement surrounding what occurs when a license is unavailable. It would
help AES create service level agreements with its internal customers.
3. Continue applying the model to more case studies. AES could do the
calculations on the top 10 most expensive software products (of which it owns
more than 10 licenses). If the potential savings seem worthwhile, Agilent
could then implement the results.
4. Refine the model and review it with more employees. Although the model
was created with the input of many, it still had limited exposure relative to the
size of the company. (<1% of Agilent's employees were involved) AES
might want to receive more buy-in from different people before it proceeds.
Furthermore, there are data integrity issues, such as discussed in Section
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2.4.14, and AES management might feel more comfortable with implementing
the results after it has more confidence in the data used.
6.4 Lessons Learned
Although I learned many important lessons during my six month internship at Agilent,
I'd like to focus on three: 1. The relevance of a company's organizational behavior, 2.
the insight that cost analysis gives, and 3. the application of existing models to new areas.
I found these particularly striking and an awareness of them will help me in future
endeavors.
The model created for this project does (and did and will) not exist in a vacuum. It is
filled with assumptions influenced by people, and the results have implications on
employees' activities. As described in Chapter 5, the power at Agilent resides with the
development engineers. I took this into account, for example, by presenting the model
with the assumption that engineers can only tolerate four hours of license unavailability
before it impacts the product schedule. I suspect that they could probably endure more,
but it would not be as politically accepted. The future use of this model will also be
influenced by the culture. The cost savings might not be significant enough to risk
countering the culture.
These observations are not made in an attempt to judge whether this is correct or not.
They are stated to show how much influence the organizational environment has. At
another company, there would have been other issues that would affect the assumptions
and the potential implementation. All of this has to be taken into consideration when
developing a model, or working on any project, and when marketing the ideas to different
organizations. It is a key component in making a project successful.
The second key learning is about the importance of quantifying costs. Companies often
use heuristics and rely on people processes to make decisions. This approach can work in
many cases, but particularly when the costs involved are substantial, quantifying trade-off
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costs can result in significant insight into the business. In this case, Agilent had
attempted the project earlier, but had doubts about issues such as the quality of the data.
These types of concerns are valid, but I think the cliche, "you have to start somewhere" is
valid too. Even if all the components are not perfect, evaluating dollars spent with
quantitative cost analysis can still provide excellent information; and now, there is a place
from which to improve.
Finally, the basis for this model is not new; it relies on proven supply chain principles.
Only the application to software licenses is unique. There is often pressure to invent and
generate fresh ideas, but this internship reinforced that there can be useful learning gained
by applying old ideas to different areas.
When reviewing the model with classmates and professors at MIT, many mentioned that
the project made them think of even other ways that the concept of inventory and stock
outs can be applied. There are many models that have been categorized for one specific
use, but there might be new, and relatively straightforward, applications that have not
been investigated, but can provide important learning. Being aware and open to these
types of opportunities could provide breakthrough information for a company.
6.5 Summary
Evaluating software licenses as one would evaluate physical inventory is a new approach
that gives companies more quantitative ways to manage their licensing programs. The
model described in this thesis is flexible for evaluating a variety of scenarios. It also
relies on proven principles and is simple enough to allow for ease of use and further
improvements. The challenge is whether organizations will decide that the cost
implications of the model are worth the inconvenience to the engineers.
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Appendix A:
Engineering Questionnaire:
Describe your experience with EDA license availability:
1. Have you ever been denied an EDA Tool license(s)? Y/N If not, continue to question 8.
Please answer questions 2-7 for a denial situation (or several situations) you've experienced.
2. Which product and application was not available?
a. Supplier:
b. Application:
3. How long did the outage last?
a. less than 1 hr
b. less than 1%day
c. less than 1 day
d. greater than 1 day
4. Did you lose productive time due to the license denial? Y/N
a. If yes, what did you do during the time you waited for the license?
5. Did the license unavailability delay the completion of the product development? Y/N
a. If yes, by how much?
i. Greater than 1 day
ii. Greater than a week
iii. Greater than a month
b. If not, at what point of hours unavailability do you think license unavailability
would affect the timing of a product launch?
6. Did the license unavailability create a need for:
a. Overtime
b. Working after hours
c. Change of work schedule
d. Creation of a new plan for sharing licenses
e. Adding extra resources
If you marked any of the above, please describe this experience in more detail.
7. What were other implications of license unavailability? (i.e. frustration, management
complaints, overtime, etc) Please describe.
EDA License Unavailability Scenarios: (ifyou answered 2-7, and do not want to
comment further, please skip to question 11)
8. How would your project be impacted if an EDA tool license was not available?
9. Up to what period of time would have a negligible affect?
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a. Less than 1 hr
b. Less than 2day
c. What would you do during the time you waited for the license?
10. At what point do you think license unavailability would affect the timing of a product
launch?
Service Levels:
11. If the license was unavailable intermittently (i.e.X hours of outage spread over a week or
a month) as opposed to X hours all at one time, would this have a different effect on your
work pattern? Y/N
a. Please describe.
12. Are there times during the development phase that license unavailability has more impact
than other times? Y/N
a. Please describe.
13. Do you have any suggestions for improving the situation if a license is unavailable? (i.e.
knowing the cause, having a notification system to know when it is available, have a
reserve system, etc)
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